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In the Australian case of Bywater Investments Ltd v Commissioner of 
Taxation; Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Commissioner of Taxation (the 
Bywater case) the Australian High Court dealt with the question of 
whether certain companies were resident in Australia for income tax 
purposes. The majority answered this question by applying Australian 
domestic law. In a separate but concurring judgement, Gordon J also 
discussed the interpretation and application of the relevant double 
taxation treaty. This contribution analyses Gordon J's judgment to 
extract guidance from it for the South African courts on their 
interpretation of double taxation treaties. 
It is submitted that South African courts should also follow the "first 
step" proposed by Gordon J when interpreting double taxation treaties. 
South African courts may find Gordon J's judgment "instructive" when 
dealing with the interpretation of the "place of effective management" 
concept in both domestic law and double taxation treaties. In his 
judgment Gordon J favours the goal of common interpretation and it is 
argued that South African courts should follow this example and 
explicitly support this notion in applicable cases. From Gordon J's 
judgment and the judgement in Krok v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service, it is deduced that the positions in South Africa and 
Australia are similar in that the courts in both countries will be bound 
by the principles of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties when interpreting double taxation treaties. Moreover, 
Gordon J's judgment indicates that the domestic principles of 
interpretation should not be used in the interpretation of double taxation 
treaties. Recent South African cases have suggested that there are no 
differences between the South African domestic principles of 
interpretation and those contained in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. This contribution submits that there 
are many similarities between the two, but that the rules are not exactly 
the same. South African courts should be aware of these differences 
and rather apply the rules of public international law, including those 
contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, when they 
interpret double taxation treaties. Gordon J specifically identifies the 
category of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in which he 
places the Commentary on the OECD Model Tax Convention, to rely 
on it for his interpretation of the relevant double taxation treaty. South 
African courts may well learn from this approach, to create more 
certainty in the process of interpreting a double taxation treaty. 
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1 Introduction 
Recently the Australian High Court delivered judgment in the case of 
Bywater Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation; Hua Wang Bank 
Berhad v Commissioner of Taxation (hereafter Bywater).1 The majority 
judgment dealt with the question of whether certain companies were 
resident in Australia for income tax purposes in terms of Australia's domestic 
laws. The minority judgment delivered by Gordon J reached the same 
conclusion as the majority in respect of the residency issue, but in addition 
discussed the interpretation and application of the relevant double taxation 
treaty (DTT). 
The purpose of this contribution is to analyse the minority judgment and to 
determine whether this judgment can guide the South African courts in their 
interpretation of DTTs. In this regard particular focus will be placed on the 
interpretation of the concept of "place of effective management" (POEM). In 
South Africa this concept is used as one of the criteria to determine whether 
a person other than an individual is resident in South Africa.2 It is also used 
in many of South Africa's DTTs as a tie-breaker provision. In other DTTs it 
is used as one of the factors that revenue authorities will take into account 
when they endeavour to determine through mutual agreement where the 
person is resident for purposes of the DTT. 
Like any other text, DTTs have to be interpreted. The approach to the 
interpretation of DTTs and the various difficulties associated with this 
exercise are addressed in many scholarly works3 and case law around the 
world. In South Africa courts have also grappled with some of these 
difficulties.4 In Bywater Australia's apex court has addressed some of these 
questions and thus a closer examination of the judgment is warranted. 
                                            
*  Izelle du Plessis. BCom (Law) (Stell) LLB (Stell) LLM (Taxation) (UCT) LLD (Stell). 
Senior Lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law, Stellenbosch University, South 
Africa. E-mail: idup@sun.ac.za. ORCiD: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6188-3973. 
1  Bywater Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation; Hua Wang Bank Berhad v 
Commissioner of Taxation 2016 HCA 45 (hereafter the Bywater case). 
2  Section 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, definition of "resident". 
3  Examples include Baker Double Taxation Conventions para E; Avery Jones "Treaty 
Interpretation"; Edwardes-Ker Tax Treaty Interpretation; Ward et al Interpretation of 
Income Tax Treaties; Vogel and Rust "Introduction". 
4  For example, Secretary for Inland Revenue v Downing 1975 4 SA 518 (A) (hereafter 
the Downing case); Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v 
Tradehold Ltd 2012 3 All SA 15 (SCA) (hereafter the Tradehold case); Krok v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2015 6 SA 317 (SCA) (hereafter 
Krok); Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Van Kets 2012 3 SA 
399 (WCC) (hereafter the Van Kets case). 
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Australia is a useful jurisdiction for comparative purposes, because it shares 
a long history with South African tax law. The South African Income Tax Act 
was initially based on the income tax legislation enacted by an Australian 
state, New South Wales.5 Furthermore, the Australian "system of taxation 
has much in common with our own",6 and therefore the South African 
Supreme Court of Appeal has on numerous occasions looked to Australian 
decisions for guidance.7 Moreover the Bywater decision is itself of 
significance, since it is the first judgment by the highest court in Australia8 
on the interpretation of DTT since Thiel v Commissioner of Taxation 
(hereafter Thiel).9 Although the South African Supreme Court of Appeal has 
on two occasions interpreted DTTs after the adoption of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution), the 
Constitutional Court has never expressed an opinion on the matter. It is 
therefore submitted that the judgment in Bywater should be examined 
carefully to assess whether it may contain lessons for the South African 
courts regarding the interpretation of DTTs. 
2 The facts in Bywater 
In Bywater four companies were held liable for income tax in Australia on 
the basis that each of these companies was resident there. Although the 
facts pertaining to each company were not identical, there were many 
similarities. Two of the companies, Chemical Trustee and Derrin, were 
incorporated in the United Kingdom. Bywater was incorporated in the 
Bahamas and Hua Wang Bank Berhad in Samoa. Shares in the first three 
companies were held through nominee companies for JA Investments or 
MA Investments, both companies incorporated in the Cayman Islands. In 
respect of Bywater, the directors were a Mr Borgas, his wife and a firm of 
professional administrators. In the case of Chemical Trustee, the directors 
comprised of Mr Borgas, his wife and their son. Only Mr and Mrs Borgas 
                                            
5  Jansen van Rensburg "History of Income Taxation in the Cape Colony"; Harris 
"Importing and Exporting Income Tax Law"; Broomberg 2008 BTR 291; 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Cactus Investments (Pty) Ltd 1999 1 SA 264 
(T) 310. 
6  Richards Bay Iron & Titanium (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1996 1 
SA 311 (A) 317. 
7  See e.g. Avenant v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service 2016 78 SATC 
343 (SCA); Richards Bay Iron & Titanium (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue 1996 1 SA 311 (A) 317; Secretary for Inland Revenue v Rile Investments 
(Pty) Ltd 1978 3 SA 732 (A). In Sentra-oes Koöperatief Bpk v Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue 1995 3 SA 197 (A) the court distinguished the facts before it from 
those in an Australian case. 
8  Davies 2019 BIT 402. 
9  Thiel v Commissioner of Taxation 1990 HCA 37 (hereafter the Thiel case). 
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were the directors of Derrin. Bywater, Chemical Trustee and Derrin argued 
that Borgas resided and operated in Switzerland and that central 
management and control10 of the relevant taxpayers was therefore in 
Switzerland. Furthermore, JA Investments and MA Investments were 
beneficially owned by Gould (of New South Wales, Australia) who made all 
the decisions. Borgas made no decisions and the apparent ownership 
structure and directorships by the Borgases and the professional 
administrators were fake or a facade. In the case of Hua Wang Bank 
Berhad, the rights of shareholders to vote or demand a poll were suspended 
until certain debentures were redeemed. Effectively the debenture holders 
controlled the company. The debentures were held by JA Investments. The 
directors of Hua Wang Bank Berhad were all (save for one) employees of a 
company providing professional administrative services. Although these 
directors performed their duties in Samoa, they acted only on directions 
from Gould. These directors made no commercial decisions and provided 
only what was called "back-office" services. 
The majority of the High Court of Australia found that Gould had usurped 
the functions of the boards of all the companies mentioned above and that 
he took all the important decisions in respect of the companies in Australia. 
It held that the meetings of the boards were window-dressing and 
constituted rubberstamping decisions already taken by Gould in Australia. 
Thus, the companies were resident in Australia for domestic income tax 
purposes. 
3 The minority judgment 
In his separate but concurring judgment, Gordon J held that Hua Wang 
Bank Berhard was centrally managed and controlled in Australia and thus 
resident in Australia for domestic income tax purposes. 
More importantly, Gordon J also investigated where Bywater, Chemical 
Trustee and Derrin's POEM was located. POEM was used as a tie-breaker 
in DTTs between Australia and the United Kingdom on the one hand and 
between Australia and Switzerland on the other. The court assumed that 
Chemical Trustee and Derrin were resident (for domestic law purposes) in 
the United Kingdom and that Bywater was resident (for domestic law 
                                            
10  In terms of the definition of "resident" in s 6(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act, 
1936, a company that is not incorporated in Australia, but which carries on business 
in Australia and has its central management and control in Australia, is an Australian 
resident. The parties conceded that in this case if the companies had its central 
management and control in Australia, its POEM would also be in Australia. The court 
found in para 6 that the concession had been properly made. 
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purposes) in Switzerland. Since the court had found that the companies 
were also resident in Australia for domestic law purposes, the provisions of 
the tie-breaker became applicable. In each of the relevant agreements, if a 
company were resident in both contracting States (as the court had found 
or assumed it was), it would be regarded as a resident for purposes of the 
DTT only in the State in which it had its POEM.11 Thus, where both States 
claimed that the company was a resident, the tie-breaker provision applied 
to determine the company's residence for treaty purposes. 
Importantly, the court pointed out that the first step in the process was to 
ascertain what and how much of an international instrument, such as the 
relevant DTTs, Australian law required to be implemented. Thus, the court 
had to establish the extent to which Australian law adopts, qualifies, or 
modifies the instrument. According to the court, this first step is critical 
because,  
… as a matter of statutory interpretation, there is a distinction between 
circumstances where [DTTs] have been enacted into Australian law and 
circumstances where provisions of an Act draw on a treaty which has not been 
enacted into Australian law.12 
The court found that since these particular DTTs were set out in full in 
legislation and given the force of law, the text of the DTT should bear the 
same meaning in the relevant domestic legislation as it bears in the DTT.13 
However, the court warned that if the terms of the DTT were interpreted 
strictly in accordance with domestic principles of statutory interpretation, 
there would be a significant risk that the DTT would be interpreted differently 
even though other countries had adopted the same instrument. The purpose 
of DTTs, which is to prevent double taxation across two jurisdictions, would 
be hindered if they were interpreted in a way that could result in conflicting 
outcomes between the two States in question.14 The court therefore 
concluded that the principles applicable to the interpretation of international 
instruments, namely those set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (hereafter the Vienna Convention),15 must be applied. 
                                            
11  Bywater case paras 154 and 177. 
12  Bywater case para 146 [footnotes omitted]. 
13  Bywater case para 147. 
14  Bywater case para 148. 
15  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) (the Vienna Convention). Australia 
acceded to the Vienna Convention in 1979. (United Nations Treaty Collection 2019 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-
1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en). 
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The court noted that the DTT between Australia and Switzerland was 
entered into before the Vienna Convention came into force.16 Although the 
Vienna Convention does not apply retrospectively, the court confirmed that 
its provisions reflected customary international law and that it was, 
therefore, appropriate to refer to the Vienna Convention when interpreting 
the Australian-Switzerland DTT.17 
The court first investigated the application of the DTT between Australia and 
the United Kingdom. Gordon J approached the interpretation of POEM in 
this treaty by referring to the Vienna Convention, which states that:18 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose. 
He held that the express terms of the phrase POEM oblige one to enquire 
further than the formal place where the formal organs of a company might 
be located. He also referred to the purpose of a DTT, namely to avoid double 
taxation; that is, taxation of the same person in respect of the same activity 
by two States. The court held that the "key determinant" for taxation in terms 
of the relevant DTT was residency, and that the purpose of the tie-breaker 
provision was to break the deadlock where the other provisions of the DTT 
did not determine which State could impose tax. The court consequently 
held that 
… its ability to break a deadlock would be seriously undermined were it 
construed so as to be limited to an inquiry about the location of the formal 
organs of a company.19 
Gordon J also relied on Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, which permits 
reference to supplementary means of interpretation to confirm a meaning 
resulting from the application of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, and 
the Australian High Court's decision in Thiel,20 to refer to the Commentary 
on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Model Tax 
Convention (hereafter the OECD MTC).21 He then quoted the relevant 
Commentary as it then read. The judge observed that the Commentary 
explained that although POEM is "ordinarily" to be found where the directors 
                                            
16  Bywater case para 149. 
17  Bywater case para 181. 
18  Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. 
19  Bywater case para 166. 
20  Thiel v Commissioner of Taxation 1990 HCA 37. 
21  Each version of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Model 
Tax Convention (OECD MTC) is accompanied by commentary, drafted by the 
OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs. 
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make their decisions, all relevant facts and circumstances must be taken 
into account.22 On the facts of the case, the court held that although 
Chemical Trustee and Derrin were incorporated in the United Kingdom and 
their ultimate shareholders were located there, the board of directors 
formally met in Switzerland, but ultimately, Mr Gould was the person who 
controlled and owned these two companies. Mr Gould took the key 
management and commercial decisions in Australia and thus the POEM 
was in Australia. 
Returning to the DTT between Australia and Switzerland in Bywater, it also 
used POEM as a tie-breaker. The court found that Mr Borgas only formally 
implemented decisions that were taken by Mr Gould in Australia. The court, 
therefore, held that 
… it is a nonsense to say that Mr Borgas was 'effectively managing' each 
entity from Switzerland. The 'place of effective management' was with Mr 
Gould in Australia.23 
4 The issues raised and possible lessons for South Africa 
4.1 Starting point: Status of treaty 
Gordon J indicated that the first step in the interpretation process was to 
ascertain to what extent the DTT formed part of Australian law. It is 
submitted that the same would be true for DTTs in South Africa. In South 
Africa, DTTs are incorporated into the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (hereafter 
the Income Tax Act) via section 231 of the Constitution and section 108(2) 
of the Income Tax Act. Thus, once a DTT has been approved by both 
houses of parliament and has been gazetted, it forms part of South African 
law.24 It is thus important to note that the whole of a DTT forms part of the 
Income Tax Act.25 
However, in Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v 
Tradehold (hereafter Tradehold),26 the court approved of the method set out 
in Ostime (Inspector of Taxes) v Australian Mutual Provident Society,27 
                                            
22  Bywater case para 169. 
23  Bywater case para 184. 
24  Krok case para 24; Van Kets case paras 18 and 25; ITC 1878 2015 77 SATC 349 
para 5. 
25  The issue of a conflict between the Income Tax Act and the provisions of a DTT falls 
outside the scope of this contribution. 
26  Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd [2012] 3 All 
SA 15 (SCA). 
27  Ostime (Inspector of Taxes) v Australian Mutual Provident Society 1959 3 All ER 
245. 
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namely "the first step in any interpretive inquiry is to ascertain where in the 
scheme of the double tax agreement the relevant tax falls, and then to 
consider whether the tax can be imposed consistently with the obligations 
undertaken thereunder."28 It is submitted that taking the "first step" 
described in Tradehold is possible only once it has been ascertained that 
the DTT forms part of the Income Tax Act, the step described by Gordon J 
as "the first step". In fact, in Tradehold the court referred to section 108(2) 
of the Income Tax Act earlier in its judgment and noted that the DTT, once 
brought into operation, has the effect of law.29 Thus the court in Tradehold 
followed Gordon J's "first step" although it described its next step of 
ascertaining where in the scheme of the DTT tax falls as its first step. It is 
submitted that South African courts, therefore, should continue to apply 
Gordon J's first step and thereafter ascertain where in the DTTs scheme the 
relevant tax falls. 
4.2 Meaning of POEM in domestic legislation and DTT30 
In Bywater Gordon J used the fact that the DTT forms part of the relevant 
legislation as the justification for his statement that the "transposed text 
should bear the same meaning in the domestic statute as it bears in the 
[DTT]."31 In attributing a meaning to the text in the DTT, he favours a 
common interpretation and proposes the application of the Vienna 
Convention. Both of these points are addressed in the paragraphs below. 
The focus for now is on the fact that Gordon J is of the view that where the 
same concept is used in a domestic statute and a DTT, the meaning of the 
concept in the domestic statute should have the same meaning as in the 
DTT. 
In South Africa the question has been raised regarding the manner in which 
the concept POEM should be interpreted, since it is used in both the Income 
Tax Act and some DTTs as a tie-breaker provision. Does the concept have 
the same meaning in the two different instruments? 
In 1997 the Katz Commission recommended that South Africa adopt POEM 
as the test for the domestic residence of persons other than natural persons. 
It is clear from this Commission's report that they recommended that a 
                                            
28  Tradehold case para 20. 
29  Tradehold case paras 15-16. 
30  The purpose of this paragraph is not to discuss the actual meaning of the POEM 
concept. Rather, it is aimed at discussing the narrow question of whether the concept 
should bear the same meaning in the Income Tax Act as it has in South African 
DTTs.  
31  Bywater case para 147 [footnotes omitted]. 
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meaning similar to that associated with the term in Article 4(3) of the OECD 
MTC be adopted in South Africa. To this end the Commission proposed that 
the term POEM be defined.32 The latter recommendation was never 
implemented and the term thus remains undefined in the Income Tax Act. 
However, one can deduce that the Katz Commission intended POEM to 
have the same meaning in both the Income Tax Act and DTTs entered into 
by South Africa. 
Some authors agree with the opinion of the Katz Commission,33 while others 
are of the view that the two have different functions and should likewise 
have different meanings.34 In The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd v Commissioner for 
the South African Revenue Service (hereafter Oceanic Trust)35 the court did 
not discuss the question of whether the meaning of the term POEM in the 
Income Tax Act, with which it was confronted, was the same as the meaning 
of the term under a DTT. However, the court did adopt the test laid down in 
the United Kingdom case of Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and 
Customs v Smallwood36 in relation to POEM, a case which dealt with the 
meaning of POEM in a DTT context. Arguably, one could deduce that the 
court by implication indicated that the same meaning should apply in the 
Income Tax Act as in a DTT. 
Naturally, the Constitution plays a determining role in how legislation should 
be interpreted. It provides that when interpreting any legislation, every court 
must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent 
with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent 
with international law.37 The DTTs entered into by South Africa are a source 
of international law38 and as such a reasonable interpretation of the Income 
Tax Act that is consistent with South Africa's DTTs should be preferred. 
Since the term POEM is used in most of South Africa's DTTs,39 it is 
                                            
32  Katz Commission 1997 http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/katz/5.pdf 
para 6.1.2.1. 
33  E.g.,  Van der Merwe 2002 SA Merc LJ 79. 
34  E.g., Olivier and Honiball International Tax 42, although their view is based on an 
Interpretation note that has since been replaced; Hattingh "South Africa" 725. 
35  The Oceanic Trust Co Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 
74 SATC 127 (hereafter the Oceanic Trust case). 
36  Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs v Smallwood 2010 EWCA 
Civ 778. 
37  Section 233 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution). 
38  Strydom "International Law Making" 68. 
39  The Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2017), to which South Africa is a party, may replace 
POEM as the tie-breaker provision in existing DTTs. However, this treaty has not 
made it through the parliamentary process of s 231 of the Constitution yet and has 
I DU PLESSIS  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  10 
submitted that the term POEM in the Income Tax Act should be interpreted 
in a way that is consistent with the term POEM used in South Africa's DTTs. 
Arguably, the fact that a DTT forms part of the Income Tax Act supports this 
point.40 Thus, the same term in a statute is presumed to have the same 
meaning.41 
It is submitted that South African courts will regard the judgment of Gordon 
J in Bywater as "instructive"42 when interpreting the POEM concept, thereby 
attaching a similar meaning to it in the Income Tax Act as it has in South 
Africa's DTTs. 
4.3 Common interpretation 
Vogel and Rust describe common interpretation as the interpretation of a 
DTT in a way that is most likely to be accepted in both contracting States.43 
Their justification for a common interpretation is that Article 31(1) of the 
Vienna Convention requires a DTT to be interpreted in the light of its objects 
and purpose. The purpose of a DTT is to allocate tax claims equally between 
the two relevant contracting States, and this purpose can be achieved only 
if the DTT is interpreted consistently by the courts in both States. Edwardes-
Ker refers to the requirement of good faith in Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
                                            
therefore not become law in South Africa. Therefore, South Africa's DTTs have not 
been amended by this treaty. 
40  Krok case para 24; Van Kets case para 25. 
41  Du Plessis "Statute Law and Interpretation" para 347. However, if the context differs, 
this presumption no longer applies. It has been argued that the context differs 
between the Income Tax Act and a DTT. See for example Hattingh "South Africa" 
725. Although the context may differ to a certain extent, it is submitted that the 
definition of "resident" in the Income Tax Act draws the DTT context into the Income 
Tax Act, by providing that if a person is deemed to be exclusively a resident of 
another state in terms of a DTT, that person is not a resident in South Africa. The 
DTT therefore forms part of the context of the Income Tax Act. Furthermore, although 
some argue that the aim of the DTT is to "determine 'best residency' from a choice 
of at least two residencies" (Gutuza 2012 SA Merc LJ 424), it is submitted that the 
aim of the Income Tax Act is also to determine a single residence for an entity (see  
Van der Merwe 2002 SA Merc LJ 88). The purpose of the DTT and that of the Income 
Tax Act can therefore be reconciled, namely to determine one residency for a person 
other than a natural person. Interpreting the term POEM in the Income Tax Act in 
this fashion, the more sensible interpretation is that which attributes the same 
meaning to POEM as it has in terms of DTTs entered into by South Africa (Natal 
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 SCA paras 
18-20). 
42  Krok case para 38 described a United Kingdom case as "instructive". According to 
Jansen van Rensburg the judgments of foreign courts are not binding on South 
African courts (Jansen van Rensburg South African Perspective on the Meaning of 
"Beneficial Ownership" 255). 
43  Vogel and Rust "Introduction" 41-42. 
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Convention to substantiate why a common interpretation must be 
followed.44 
Gordon J in Bywater seems to support the notion of common interpretation. 
He points to the purpose of DTTs, which is to prevent double taxation across 
two jurisdictions. This purpose would be frustrated if they were interpreted 
in a way that could result in conflicting outcomes between the two States in 
question. When interpreting DTTs, recent South African decisions also 
seem to favour a common interpretation, although perhaps not expressly. 
For example, in Tradehold, the court stated that 
… the term must be given a meaning that is congruent with the language of 
the DTT having regard to its object and purpose.45 
Furthermore, the court in that case specifically considered the meaning 
which both State parties intended the specific term to bear.46 A further 
example may be found in ITC 1878, where the court arguably regarded the 
                                            
44  Edwardes-Ker Tax Treaty Interpretation para 5.02. The influence of an article in a 
DTT similar to art 3(2) of the OECD MTC should be borne in mind when the goal of 
common interpretation is pursued. This article, which is included in some form in all 
of South Africa's DTTs, provides that "[a]s regards the application of the Convention 
at any time by a Contracting State, any term not defined therein shall, unless the 
context otherwise requires or the competent authorities agree to a different meaning 
pursuant to the provisions of Article 25, have the meaning that it has at that time 
under the law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention 
applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a 
meaning given to the term under other laws of that State". If art 3(2) applies to a 
given term, it may result in the two states attaching different meanings to the same 
term. Jansen van Rensburg points out that when art 3(2) applies, the states have 
agreed "the possibility of diverse outcomes in the interpretation of the same term" 
(Jansen van Rensburg South African Perspective on the Meaning of "Beneficial 
Ownership" 126). 
45  Tradehold case para 23 [own emphasis]. 
46  Tradehold case para 24. It is interesting to contrast para 24 in the Tradehold case 
with the unreported decisions of the Tax Court in Cape Town in ABC (Pty) Ltd v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services (Tax Court of South Africa, 
Cape Town) (unreported) case number 14287 of 12 June 2019 (hereafter the ABC 
case). In the latter case the court refused to allow evidence regarding the intention 
of the state parties to a DTT, because it contravened the parol evidence rule. Yet in 
the Tradehold case the court referred to the parties' intention. It is submitted that the 
apparent contradiction can be easily explained. In the ABC case the court did not 
allow the evidence of the state parties about how they understood the words used in 
the DTT. The court used the wording of the DTT to determine its meaning. In the 
Tradehold case the court likewise considered the words of the DTT to determine its 
meaning and from these words, the court determined what was intended. In other 
words, the court will use the words of the DTT to interpret it. However, the parties 
may not testify to the court what they intended, in order for the court to interpret the 
words. Therefore, the parol evidence rule does not conflict with the idea of a common 
interpretation. In the latter, the court interprets a DTT in a way that is most likely to 
be accepted in both contracting states, but the states do not testify as to their 
intention. 
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Commentary to the OECD MTC as a means of achieving a common 
interpretation by stating that the Commentary seeks to minimise the 
different interpretations that may be placed on the same words by the 
different States.47 Jansen van Rensburg is also of the opinion that South 
African courts normally apply a common interpretation, but makes the point 
that South African courts have also been prepared to depart from such an 
interpretation.48 
It is submitted that there is sufficient justification for South African courts to 
apply a common interpretation in relevant cases where the interpretation of 
DTTs is called for.49 It is submitted that South African courts should follow 
the example of Gordon J and explicitly support this notion in applicable DTT 
cases.  
4.4 The Vienna Convention 
Gordon J relied on the principles of the Vienna Convention to interpret the 
relevant DTTs in Bywater. These principles were used in the interpretation 
of the Australia-Switzerland DTT, even though the Vienna Convention itself 
did not apply. 
South Africa has not ratified the Vienna Convention and in that sense, the 
Vienna Convention itself does not apply to South Africa. However, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Krok v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service (hereafter Krok)50 stated that Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention are binding on South Africa as rules of customary 
international law. The Constitution provides that customary international law 
is law in South Africa unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act 
of parliament.51 South African courts will, therefore, be bound to apply these 
rules of the Vienna Convention when interpreting any DTT. It can 
consequently be deduced that the positions in South Africa and Australia 
are similar in that the courts in both countries will be bound by the principles 
of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention when interpreting DTTs. 
                                            
47  ITC 1878 2015 77 SATC 349 para 15. However, the court departed from the 
interpretation provided by the Commentary and gave its own interpretation of the 
relevant phrase. 
48  Jansen van Rensburg South African Perspective on the Meaning of "Beneficial 
Ownership" 224. 
49  See further Jansen van Rensburg South African Perspective on the Meaning of 
"Beneficial Ownership" 219-224 for cogent arguments regarding the use of common 
interpretation by South African courts in DTT cases. 
50  Krok case para 27. 
51  Section 232 of the Constitution. 
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However, one may question whether South African courts have indeed 
applied these principles. There are many examples of cases where the 
South African courts when considering DTTs did not even mention the 
Vienna Convention.52 However, since the Krok-decision two judgments of 
the Tax Court have referred to the relevant provisions of the Vienna 
Convention.53 It is hoped that this trend will continue and that all judgments 
in which South African courts interpret DTTs will rely on these principles of 
the Vienna Convention. 
4.5 Domestic principles of statutory interpretation versus the Vienna 
Convention 
In the part of his judgment dealing with common interpretation, Gordon J 
warned that if the terms of the DTT were interpreted strictly in accordance 
with domestic principles of statutory interpretation, there would be a 
significant risk that the DTT would be interpreted differently even though 
other countries had adopted the same instrument. This statement raises the 
question of whether domestic principles of interpretation should be used in 
the interpretation of DTTs. Gordon J is clearly of the view that they should 
not. 
However, in Krok the SCA stated that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention "are essentially no different from those [rules] generally applied 
by our courts in construing statutes and agreements."54 In the unreported 
judgment of the Tax Court in Cape Town, the court stated that:55 
The question to be determined therefore requires this court to apply the 
legal principles relating to the interpretation of written agreements and 
more specifically those concluded in the realm of international law. The 
starting point is South African domestic law and then if appropriate private 
international law of which the primary source is the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties of 1969. 
It is submitted that the reference to "private" international law in the quote 
above, is probably a minor error, which should rather read "public" 
international law since the Vienna Convention falls within the realm of public 
international law. However, very little turns on this description. It is the 
                                            
52  Volkswagen of South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Service 70 SATC 195 (the Volkswagen case), Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd 2012 3 All SA 15 (SCA); Grundlingh v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2009 72 SATC 1; ITC 1878 
2015 77 SATC 349. 
53  ITC 1914 2018 80 SATC 472 and the ABC case. 
54  Krok case para 27. 
55  ABC case para 19. 
I DU PLESSIS  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  14 
court's method of referring first to domestic law and only later and only "if 
appropriate" referring to international law and the Vienna Convention which 
is problematic. Later in the judgment the court also relies on Krok for the 
statement that the principles applicable to the interpretation of statutes and 
agreements in South African law are the same as those applied in 
international law.56 
Although the SCA and the Tax Court regard the rules of the Vienna 
Convention and those regarding the interpretation of domestic law and 
agreements to be the same, Jansen van Rensburg points out that there are 
at least some differences between the two. One of the examples of such 
differences is that the goal of common interpretation is not present when 
domestic statutes are interpreted.57 It is therefore submitted that there are 
indeed many similarities58 between the rules of the Vienna Convention and 
the rules regarding the interpretation of domestic statutes, but the rules are 
not exactly the same. South African courts should be alive to these 
differences and rather apply the rules of public international law, including 
those contained in the Vienna Convention, when they interpret DTTs. In this 
regard the Tax Court's statement that international law and the Vienna 
Convention will be referred to only if appropriate cannot be supported. 
4.6 The use of the Commentary 
Interestingly, Gordon J relied on Article 32 of the Vienna Convention as 
authority for his reference to the Commentary. This Article allows the use of 
"supplementary means of interpretation", but only to confirm a meaning 
determined through the application of Article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31 leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable. Therefore, supplementary means of interpretation may be 
used only in the limited circumstances referred to. In this case Gordon J 
relied on the Commentary to confirm the meaning of the POEM concept that 
he had already determined. 
Many courts around the world agree that Article 32 of the Vienna 
Convention may be relied on to justify reference to the Commentary when 
interpreting a DTT59 and thus Gordon J's judgment cannot be faulted on this 
                                            
56  ABC case para 33. 
57  Jansen van Rensburg South African Perspective on the Meaning of "Beneficial 
Ownership" 225. 
58  See Burt 2017 BTCLQ fn. 37 for a discussion of the similarities. 
59  Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 3.11.4. 
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score. However, the real question regarding the Commentary is whether it 
may be relied on as part of the Article 31 interpretation process. The reason 
for this debate is that if the Commentary falls within Article 32 only, it may 
be referred to only in the limited circumstances outlined above.60 Gordon J 
did not have to address this point in his judgment and followed the judgment 
in Thiel61 which also relied on Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
The OECD Commentary does not fit easily into any of the possibilities found 
in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.62 Moreover, which one of 
these possibilities should be preferred is the subject of scholarly debate.63 
However, the courts in many States use the OECD Commentary to interpret 
DTTs, but the exact basis on which they do so is unclear and not frequently 
explicitly stated.64 In this sense the judgment in Bywater is an exception, 
because it explicitly relied on Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
South African courts have not been consistent in their reference to the 
Commentary. Some courts have not mentioned the Commentary, even 
though it may have been relevant.65 Other courts have indeed referred to 
the Commentary.66 The Tax Court has even adopted an interpretation that 
is contrary to that set out in the Commentary, because in the court's view 
the Commentary does not take into account certain words in the OECD 
MTC.67 No South African court has yet pronounced on the basis upon which 
they referred to the Commentary, or attempted to categorise it within the 
Vienna Convention.68 It is submitted that the Australian courts' approach in 
Thiel and Bywater, which states explicitly in which category of the Vienna 
Convention it places the Commentary in order to rely on it is the preferred 
approach, even though it is the exception when compared to the courts of 
many other States. It is submitted that this approach provides some 
                                            
60  Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 3.11.2.1. 
61  Thiel v Commissioner of Taxation 1990 HCA 37. 
62  Baker Double Taxation Conventions para E12; Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" 
para 3.11; Ward et al Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties 29; Jansen van Rensburg 
South African Perspective on the Meaning of "Beneficial Ownership" 118. 
63  Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 3.11; Baker Double Taxation Conventions 
para E12; Garbarino Judicial Interpretation of Tax Treaties paras I.76-I.88; Ward et 
al Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties 18. 
64  Baker Double Taxation Conventions para E.12; Arnold 2010 BIT 8; Mössner 2010 
BIT 16 17; Harris and Oliver International Commercial Tax 34. 
65  E.g., the Volkswagen case; Grundlingh v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service 2009 72 SATC 1; ITC 1544 1992 54 SATC 456 (T); ITC 1735 2002 
64 SATC 455; Tradehold case; Oceanic Trust case; ITC 1914 2018 80 SATC 472  
66  E.g., the Downing case; ITC 1503 1990 53 SATC 342 (T); the Krok case. 
67  ITC 1878 2015 77 SATC 349. 
68  Jansen van Rensburg South African Perspective on the Meaning of "Beneficial 
Ownership" 244. 
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certainty to taxpayers and tax administrators regarding the process that the 
court will apply when interpreting a DTT. South African courts may well learn 
from this Australian example. 
5 Conclusion 
Like the approach of Gordon J in Bywater, South African courts will also, 
when applying a DTT, as a first step determine the extent to which the DTT 
forms part of South African law. The second step in the interpretive process 
is to ascertain where in the DTTs scheme the relevant tax falls. It is 
submitted that these two steps were also applied in Tradehold. 
In Bywater Gordon J was of the view that words should bear the same 
meaning in the domestic statute as they bear in a DTT. South African courts 
will find this judgment instructive and will interpret the POEM concept by 
attaching a similar meaning to it in the Income Tax Act as it has in South 
Africa's DTTs. Oceanic Trust may be an example of where the court has 
done exactly this. 
Gordon J in Bywater seems to support the notion of a common interpretation 
of DTTs. Arguably, recent South African cases have done the same, 
although they have not referred to this notion explicitly. It is submitted that 
South African courts should follow the example of Gordon J and explicitly 
support this notion in applicable DTT cases.  
As the court in Bywater confirmed, the Articles in the Vienna Convention 
dealing with the interpretation of treaties are customary international law. In 
South Africa the SCA came to the same conclusion in Krok, and both States 
are therefore bound to apply these rules when interpreting DTTs. Decisions 
after Krok have referred to the Vienna Convention and this should be 
welcomed. However, South African courts should take heed of the fact that 
the rules regarding interpretation in the Vienna Convention and those used 
to interpret domestic legislation are not identical. Although there may be 
significant overlap in these two sets of rules, it is submitted that South 
African courts should interpret DTTs in accordance with the principles of 
public international law, like those contained in the Vienna Convention. 
The courts in many States refer to the OECD Commentary on the 
interpretation of DTTs, but the exact basis on which they do so is uncertain 
and often it is not mentioned explicitly. However, the court in Bywater based 
its reliance on the Commentary on Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
Although this may limit the use of the Commentary, the court should be 
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commended for unambiguously stating the basis on which it relied on the 
Commentary. South African courts have not always relied on the 
Commentary and where they have, they have not always mentioned the 
basis. It is submitted that South African courts should follow Gordon J's 
example and state explicitly why they rely on the Commentary. 
The judgment of Gordon J in Bywater may provide valuable guidance to 
South African courts regarding the interpretation of DTTs. Since South 
African courts have not always been consistent in some aspects of their 
interpretation of DTTs, such guidance on issues of principle should be 
regarded as "instructive" and therefore followed. 
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